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Because of its salient features of extreme scalability, flexibility, self-configuration, self-
organization, and resilience to failures, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) overlay network paradigm
has been hailed in both industry and academia [1]. P2P systems have made tremen-
dous progress in fundamental data lookup and content management [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
The increasing popularity of P2P systems, social networks, online business paradigms
(e.g. eBay) has made them prone to malicious behaviors and attacks. Furthermore,
many P2P systems do not have central administration and peers are autonomous,
making them inherently insecure and untrustful.
In the meanwhile, a large percent of Internet users now routinely use online social
networks such as Facebook to manage and document their relationships to others.
While such systems provide a convenient and user-friendly interface for users to record
aspects of their trust relationships, users are subject to the need to also trust the social
network provider, because all messages and data are subject to the provider’s policies.
Recent user backlashes due to changes in privacy in major providers such as Facebook
show that there is significant user demand for social networking infrastructures where
users not only establish trust on who they link with, but also who may relay or store
data used in the interactions with trusted peers.
To handle trustworthiness issues of these services in open and decentralized envi-
ronments, trust and reputation scheme has been proposed to establish trust among
peers in P2P systems [9]. In a reputation system, statistics are maintained about the
performance of each entity in the system, and these statistics are used to infer how
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entities are likely to behave in the future. In general, one good P2P reputation sys-
tem should be low-cost to build, easy to update, and fast in reputation aggregation,
inference and dissemination.
However, these schemes focus mainly on how to design fair trust ratings, manage
trust locally or globally, and different trust inference mechanisms. There is still
no well designed standard and criteria in trust ratings schemes. The current trust
ratings schemes are mostly algorithms rather than systems, which are far away from
deploying in real P2P and social networks. Different from these relatively isolated
studies, we aim to propose a trust and reputation system to promote trust into
a coherent trust system with salient features such as end-to-end trust, trust flow,
trust spanning tree, and trust closure. Furthermore, this project investigates how to
automatically map information inferred from TrustNet into services layered on top of
a P2P or social network. To fill the gap between theoretic trust rating schemes and
reality P2P application requirements, we propose the notion of trust overlay network
middleware (TrustNet) and protocols to initialize a common framework for trust and
reputation management research. TrustNet defines the architecture, protocols and
services to maintain such an overlay network. Different from most previous work on
trust and reputation management systems, we attempt to formulate a set of trust
network protocols so that we can have a common framework to investigate, compare,
and implement different trust rating and aggregation algorithms, in a similar way
as standardized network protocols that paved a solid ground for intensive network
research. In TrustNet, we define our own trust rating, trust aggregation, and trust
dissemination schemes. TrustNet provides a flexible trust overlay network that can
be embedded into existing systems or independently coexist with other distributed
systems (e.g. data/content sharing systems and social network). Based on TrustNet,
applications or upper-level middleware can obtain all trust services and also provide
feedback on transactions.
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Our approach building upon Peer-to-Peer computing (P2P) and ad hoc networks
applies not only to data lookup and content/information retrieval, but also to au-
tonomously map social network relationships. We aim to provide a communication
layer upon which existing as well as emerging social “friend-to-friend” applications
that address privacy and trust concerns in a decentralized manner. We pursues re-
search that lay the foundation of a transformative architecture of peer-to-peer overlays
that are able to self-organizing trust models which can be effectively mapped to access
control in end-to-end communications and services.
Research Goals. Our overarching research goal in this proposed project is to
formulate a TrustNet framework with well-defined protocols and algorithms towards
unified trust network research and standardization. TrustNet is aimed to initiate
pioneering trust network research and theory, filling the gap of the missing science and
common foundation in the current trust and reputation community. The success of
TrustNet initiative could lead to a paradigm shift in trust and reputation management
research. To meet these trailblazing goals, we propose the following research thrusts.
• Define the TrustNet overlay network architecture and initiate its specification
blueprint. What is the best architecture for trust dissemination, aggregation,
inference, and management in an efficient, effective, and flexible manner?
• Define trust dissemination and aggregation protocols and algorithms. How to
securely and efficiently communicate trust? How to represent trust? How to
interpret trust? And how to infer trust? We propose an initial trust vector
dissemination protocol.
• Implement and evaluate the proposed TrustNet overlay network architecture
and protocols and algorithms on each layer.
• Design the incentive mechanism to reinforce users to provide truthful feedback
in reputation systems.
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• Build and simulate TrustNet system. The prototype can start with a distributed
P2P-based computing-resource or social network applications.
The rest of the proposal is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the related
works for both reputation systems and truthful feedback incentive mechanisms. In
Chapter 3, we propose the TrustNet framework and discuss the possible research
tasks. We propose our design in Chapter 4 and discuss trust management problems





Driven by urgent needs in commercial offerings and increasing popularity for content
and multimedia sharing, many trust and reputation systems have been proposed
recently, for example, the most popular reputation system is the feedback scheme
used by the eBay. Clients give feedbacks after their transactions with a 1, -1 or 0
ratings. eBay is a centralized global reputation system. In eBay, there is a reputation
server to store and manage all the entities’ reputation. The eBay feedback system
assumes most users are providing truthful feedbacks.
Xiong and Liu developed PeerTrust, a reputation-based trust supporting frame-
work in a distributed P2P network [10]. PeerTrust uses five trust parameters to
compute trust scores of peers. In their paper, a general trust metric on how to use
these parameters to compute global trust ratings is presented.
The EigenTrust scheme proposed by Kamvar et al. proposes a method to compute
a global trust value for each peer in the network by calculating the eigenvector of a
normalized local trust rating matrix [11]. EigenTrust is inspired by PageRank and
it gathers the entire systems history transaction and trust information to yield a
global reputation score for each peer. They have designed several threaten models
in their paper. The simulation under various attack models shows that EigenTrust
significantly decreases the risk.
Zhou et al. developed the PowerTrust system for distributed hash table based P2P
structures [12]. The scheme gathers locally peer feedback information and aggregates
these scores to the global reputation rating. PowerTrust dynamically selects a small
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set of power nodes that are most reputable to increase the reputation aggregation
accuracy and computation speed. Zhou et al. have also built the GossipTrust system
by gossip-based aggregation algorithms [13]. GossipTrust use bloom filters to achieve
efficient storage for the rank of global reputation. These two schemes focus on the
reputation aggregation processes. The truthful reporting problem is not the main
consideration in their works.
Song et al. built the FuzzyTrust System [14]. They constructed a P2P reputation
system based on fuzzy logic inferences. They evaluated the FuzzyTrust system using
eBay real transaction data. In the experiment, they compared the performance of
FuzzyTrust and EigenTrust and concluded that FuzzyTrust is efficient and robust.
Liang and Shi proposed PET, a personalized economic-based trust model for the
P2P resource sharing [15]. PET model consists of two major components: reputation
calculation and risk evaluation. Their conclusion is that risk is important in designing
a personalized trust system as well as reputation rating.
NICE project is a trust inference scheme in distributed P2P networks [16]. In
NICE, the authors model the network as a trust graph. They use the trust inference
among the trust graph to infer indirect remote trust. The idea of trust graph and
the low overhead trust information search and inference algorithms is the major con-
tribution of this paper. With the direct trust ratings existing, the paper focuses on
trust inference instead of the trust rating’s truthfulness.
Ali Aydm Selcuk and his colleagues proposed a personalized trust management
system to calculate trust rating and identify the malicious peers in a P2P network [17].
In their proposed scheme, the users make record of history transactions. Then the
scheme computes trust score by using local history transactions information. The
generated trust table will be updated periodically. In the end of their paper, they
conducted experimental simulation and concluded that the proposed system was ac-
curate and effective.
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H. Zhao and X. Li proposed a H-Index based group trust rating aggregation scheme
H-Trust [18] which was inspired by the h-index aggregation technique. In their paper,
individual reputation and group reputation is generated by computing the H-value.
H. Zhao and X. Li also proposed the concept of trust vector and a trust management
scheme VectorTrust for aggregation of distributed trust scores [19, 20], and a trust
scheme for cyclic mobile space cTrust [21].
Recently, more reputation systems were proposed. Credence is a decentralized
object reputation and ranking management system for large-scale peer-to-peer file
shearing networks [22]. The one hop reputation protocol is designed for propagating
reputation in P2P network for making service decision [23]. A collaboration-based
autonomous reputation system is proposed for Email services [24].
We compared the performance of major trust rating system in [19, 20], and clas-
sified some major existing reputation and trust systems into a quadrant of taxonomy
in [18] according to rating global [11, 13, 12, 14, 10] or personalized [15, 18, 16, 17,
19, 20, 21] trust rating, full[11, 13, 15, 10] or selective [12, 14, 16, 18, 17, 19, 20, 21]
aggregation mechanisms.
In the field of MANETs trust management system, Sonja Buchegger and Jean-
Yves Le Boudec proposed a reputation scheme to detect misbehavior in MANETs [25].
Their scheme is based on a modified Bayesian estimation method. Sonja Bucheggery
and his colleague also proposed a self-policing reputation mechanism [26]. The scheme
is based on nodes’ locally observation, and it leverages second-hand trust information
to rate and detect misbehaving nodes. The CORE system adopts a reputation mech-
anism to achieve nodes cooperation in MANETs [27]. The goal of CORE system is to
prevent nodes’ selfish behavior. [25], [26] and [27] mainly deal with the identification
and isolation of misbehaved nodes in MANETs, but the mobility feature of MANETs
is not fully addressed in these previous work. Our scheme will focus on high mo-
bility setting (with time and location factors) as well as malicious nodes. Yan Sun
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etc. considered trust as a measure of uncertainty, and they presented a formal model
to represent, model and evaluate trust in MANETs [28]. Ganeriwal, Saurabh et al.
extended the trust scheme application scenario to sensor networks and they built a
trust framework for sensor networks [29]. Another Ad Hoc trust scheme is [30] where
the trust confidence factor was proposed.
Some works tried to quantitatively model the behavior of honest and dishonest
peers in trust systems [31, 32], More recent trust and reputation research addressing
various issues include [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]. Comprehensive surveys and overviews
can be found in [9, 39, 40, 41].
However, most of the reputation systems assume that users are willing to pro-
vide reputation feedbacks voluntarily and truthfully. In the field of truthful feedback
incentive mechanisms, to encourage truthful feedbacks, R.Jurca and B.Faltings pro-
posed to compare the two reports from the transacted seller and the buyer [42]. In
their scheme, the equilibrium is the cooperative behavior. Their results show that the
proposed scheme discovers the real interaction outcome. A side payment approach is
used in their incentive scheme.
R.Jurca and B.Faltings also proposed to compare the reports with previous trusted
reports to determine the trustworthiness of the report [43]. In this scheme, the equilib-
ria of two incentive-compatible reputation mechanisms is analyzed. By using trusted
reports, undesired equilibrium points can be eliminated.
In decentralized environment, R.Jurca et al. proposed a currency-based payment
scheme that encourages peers to provide truthful ratings[44]. In their paper, the
agents only pay for the reputation feedback if and only if the feedback matches the
next feedback submitted for the same target peer from another reporter.
Michal Feldman and his colleague proposed an incentive approach based on game
theory [45]. The incentive problem is modeled using prisoners dilemma. A distributed
reciprocative decision function is proposed as the incentives technique. However, their
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approach did not take lying on the contribution of other peers into account. In our
proposed wage-based incentive mechanism, lying will definitely lead to low utility.
A truthful feedbacks incentive scheme for exchanging services in a P2P reputation
system was presented by Papaioannou [46]. In their paper, both transacted peers are
required to provide feedbacks on the mutual transaction’s performance. If the two
feedbacks are not consistent which indicates that at least one of them is lying, both
transacting nodes are punished. A credibility mechanism is used to determine each
peer’s punishment severity.
Ze Li and Haiying Shen proposed to use both reputation system and price-based
system to ensure cooperative in distributed environment [47]. The authors use game
theory to investigate and model the underlying cooperation incentive issues. Their
results show that their system that combines both reputation system and price-based
system achieves better incentive performance than single reputation system or price-
based system.
Most of the above schemes are based on the comparison of the reports [42, 43, 44,
46]. These schemes compare the feedback reports with transacted peers’ reports, pre-
vious trusted reports, or the next feedback report. This comparison based approach
involves the problems in the storage of history reports and the collusion attack risk.
Different from the comparison based schemes, our proposed solution does not require
peers to verify the information truthfulness. The solution requires only localized wage
payment schemes.
E.Fehr and S.Gachter did an interesting experiment in [48]. The results show
that individuals are willing to punish selfish behaviors if they are given such chances,
although the altruistic punishment is costly for them and yield no material gain. The
paper shows that cooperation flourishes in environments where altruistic punishment
is enabled.
More related research addressing various incentive issues includes [49, 50, 51, 52,
9
























































































































































Figure 3.1: TrustNet Conceptual Architecture
As shown in Figure 3.1, the proposed TrustNet architecture is built on top of P2P
networks and aimed to provide various trust and reputation services to higher layer
applications. The basic foundation of TrustNet is a trust overlay network consist-
ing of Trust Vector (TV). TV is first proposed in TrustNet to represent individual
peer’s personalized trust towards another peer as a vector of trust direction and
trust rating. To maintain such a trust overlay network efficiently and accurately,
two sub-layers in TrustNet are proposed. Trust rating layer provides direct trust
ratings and trust normalization for direct transactions/file downloads/interation in
social networks. Trust dissemination layer define the TrustNet metrics and Trust-
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Net dissemination/aggregation protocols. TrustNet provides trusted services to P2P
network applications.
Trust dissemination layer defines the TrustNet metrics and most of TrustNet pro-
tocols. Trust vector is presented in trust dissemination layer and the relative actions
and are also defined. Trust dissemination protocol is running on this layer to provide
fast trust propagation for the whole network. Our own trust rating algorithms are
designed and implemented in trust rating layer. Especially, we propose the idea of
group reputation and group trust. Major existing trust rating schemes should be
also implemented in trust rating layer. Trust management strategies and trust mod-
els were implemented to manage and evaluate TrustNet in trust dissemination layer.
Trust modeling provides a global view to TrustNet manager. Users manage TrustNet
and investigate TrustNet features by using TrustNet modeling. All the APIs and in-
terfaces will be defined and provided to TrustNet users. Some initial TrustNet models
will be developed with the original version of TrustNet including Trust Spanning Tree
Model, Trust Transitive Closure Model, Trust Network Flows, Malicious Peer Report-
ing Model, Trust Traffic Analysis Model, Trust Rating Measurement Model, Behavior
Modeling Component and Incentive Mechanisms.
TrustNet involves a set of trust services exposed to applications, upper-level mid-
dleware, or other coexistent mechanisms. These services include various trust query
services, user interfaces to set user priorities, reporting and statistics services. For
example, the trust query engine in TrustNet can provide information about a peer’s
trust rating, a group of peers’ trust rating, a peer’s outreach range, whether a peer
is reachable from another peer, and global statistics.
Trust rating layer gathers the performance of each entity in the direct transactions
in a network, and aggregates it into proper trust ratings by using trust rating algo-
rithms. These ratings are used to infer how entities are likely to behave in the future.
The trust ratings will spread in the whole network in trust dissemination layer.
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The rating scheme should be low-cost to build, easy to update, and fast in repu-
tation aggregation, inference and dissemination.
The foundation of TrustNet research is to lied a solid trust dissemination layer.
The trust overlay network is defined in trust dissemination layer. The vertices in
TrustNet correspond to peers in a network system. The value of the directed edge A
to B reflects how much A trusts B. Each peer maintains a local trust table to store
trust information.
The vertices in the graph correspond to peer states (time and location) in a net-
work. An directed solid edge shows the initial trust relation (as trust rating and trust
direction) and encounter/contact time. The dashed line shows the peers’ movement
trace in a social network (In facebook/linkedin where peers have no real movements,
the vertices could be considered as peers’ various states by time).]
We propose the concept of trust vector in TrustNet. The directed link with trust
rating is trust vector. In TrustNet, a trust is propagated as a vector of trust rating
and direction, where trust rating is defined as a real number r, r ∈ [0, 1] and direction
is defined as a directed edge in the trust graph. In TrustNet system, we also propose
the concept of trust transfer. If Peer A has trust rating TA,B towards Peer B, Peer B
has trust rating TB,C towards Peer C, then using trust transfer, A has indirect trust
TA,C towards C. TA,C = TA,B ∗ TB,C . If A and B have never had a prior transaction,
A has to infer a trust value for B by using trust transfer on the trust graph. There
might be many trust paths from Peer A to Peer C. Given a set of paths between A
and C, A tends to choose the Most Trustable Path (MTP). The most trustable path
can be computed as the maximal production value of all directed edges along a path.
And this production will be considered as A’s trust rating towards C.
For each direct transaction/encounter in the social network system, participating
peers generates a direct trust link and assigns a trust rating to represent the quality of
this transaction. The link points to the server of this transaction, and the trust rating
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could be calculated by different trust rating schemes under various environments. So
each transaction in the system can either adds a new directed edge in the trust graph,
or relabels the value of an existing edge with its new trust rating or a compound value
of both old and new trust ratings calculated by some trust rating schemes.
The trust table is required for each peer. Trust table consist of the remote peer ID
as entry, the trust rating for each possible remote peer, the next hop, the total hops
(optional)to reach the remote peer and the rating scheme used. Each entry shows
only the next hop instead of the whole trust path. Besides of trust table, each peer
has to make record for all its previous clients to be used in trust dissemination. The
trust table stores only the most reliable trust path.
In the initial stage of an evolving trust overlay network, trust ratings are stored in
users’ local trust tables. However, the direct or queried trust information is limited
and does not cover all potential interactions. For most remote peers, without adequate
direct trust information, they have to use indirect trusts to start the process. The
inferred trust can be obtained by using Trust Dissemination Protocol (TDP).
Our main goal in trust dissemination layer is to develop, formulate, and implement
trust dissemination layer protocols. TDP gathers trust ratings to any peer in a
network. And spreads and aggregates the trust information. In such protocols, remote
and indirect trust information will be added to peers’ trust table and be updated as
the dissemination process evolves. Two sample dissemination algorithms in TrustNet
are VectorTrust Aggregation Algorithm [19, 20] and Markov Chain Based Distributed
Trust Aggregation Algorithm [21].
TDP runs on trust dissemination layer to provide fast trust propagation for the
whole network by following these four steps: 1) Initialize Trust Table: Initialize each
peer’s trust table in TrustNet; 2) Trust Rating: After each direct transaction or trust
query phase, each client peer give trust rating for the server peer and insert this
information into client peer’s trust table; 3) Periodical Information Update: Each
14
peer sends its table to all previous clients neighbor peers periodically; 4) Trust Table
Update: When a peer receives trust tables from its neighbors, it relax the trust rating
to all possible peers and updates its own trust table to reflect any changes.
One completed trust dissemination protocol will be proposed, which supports fully
dynamic social network system. The protocol will be defined as the rules governing
the syntax, semantics, and synchronization of communication. The dissemination
protocol should be simple and efficient in terms of the convergence time. The accuracy,
scalability, robustness, overhead should be ensured, and the protocol should require
little, if any management. It should cover such information as bandwidth, network
delay, trust hop count, trust path cost, load, reliability, and communication cost. All
the trust dissemination layer protocol detail will be defined, including the handshaking
rules. message starting rules, the trust table structure, peer join/leave rules and the
message format. The corrupted or improperly formatted messages should be dealt
properly (error correction). And detection an unexpected loss of the connection or
message will also be considered in our protocol. These schemes can also be further
enhanced or replaced by others in TrustNet.
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CHAPTER 4
TRUST RATING AND TRUST AGGREGATION
In TrustNet system, we propose three trust dissemination/aggregation scheme to
be used in various environments. In highly dynamic environment, we propose the H-
Trust aggregation scheme. And in relative static networks, VectorTrust dissemination
will be adopted to maintain trust relation. cTrust dissemination leverages the power
of trust vector and it provides a solution in cyclic mobile space.
4.1 Reactive Trust Aggregation Scheme: H-Trust
The H-Trust scheme is implemented in five phases. The trust recording phase records
the information of the past services in service history table which is maintained in
the DHT-based overlay network. In local trust evaluation phase, a local trust score
is calculated by a local trust manager using weighted trust aggregation algorithm.
The trust query phase is required when the trust information is not available locally.
The credibility factors of the responses and H-Index aggregation is proposed in this
phase to yield individual’s personalized trust rating. The spatial-temporal update
phase is activated periodically to renew the local trust scores and credibility factors.
The most significant and novel phase is the group reputation evaluation phase where
we propose the first approach to aggregate the group reputation using the H-Trust
algorithm. The details of these functional phases are presented in the subsequent
sections.
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1001 2 20/07 5 4
1002 4 22/07 2 3
1003 7 24/08 2 5
1004 24 26/08 4 5
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4.1.1 Trust Records
In H-Trust system, we use the Local Service History Table (LSHT) to record the
history of past transactions or services information in each peer. Every peer maintains
a LSHT for other peers which it had interactions with in the past as illustrated in
Table 4.1. The trust rating for one peer towards the other is based on the statistics
collected from its LSHT.
The information recorded in the Local Service History Table includes remote peer
ID, service date, service importance and service quality. More recent service activities
should have a greater impact on a peer’s trust score than older ones. The importance
of a service is introduced in H-Trust system as an important context that should be
incorporated to weigh the feedback for that service. It can act as a defense against
some of the subtle malicious attacks where a service provider gains a good reputation
by being honest for smaller and less important services and tries to make profit by
being dishonest for critical services.
The service quality rating may be a binary value (“0” represents dishonest transac-
tion and “1” represents honest transaction) in some other schemes like Ali’s P2Prep [17]
or a continuous scale (e.g., [0, 1]). Dellarocas concluded that binary reputation mech-
anisms will not function well and the resulting market outcome will be unfair if judg-
17
ment is inferred from knowledge of the sum of positive and negative ratings alone [58].
And the continuous scale is complex for the local peers to rank a service. So we extend
the service quality score from binary value and continuous scale to 5 grades rating in
a scaled integer of 1 to 5.
Table 4.2: Peer i’s Local Trust Rating Table
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4.1.2 Local Trust Ratings
Once relevant service history information has been gathered and stored in LSHT,
individual peers may use different local inference algorithms to derive trust values.
Table 4.2 shows an example Local Trust Rating Table (LTRT) maintained in peer i
in the network. Peer i calculates and keeps all the trust ratings towards the other
peers of the network locally. We do not limit the Local Trust Rating aggregation
functions here. Applying different functions to LSHT allows a peer to calculate a
rating best suited for the given situation. Some typical apaches to calculate the local
trust ratings are given in [17, 14].
P2P Grid systems involve numerous peers, where a peer often has no direct trans-
18
action experience with some peers and so that it cannot record all other peers’ infor-
mation in its LSHT. Therefore, it leads to that the trust information towards some
peers is not available in LTRT. E.g. the local peer i has no direct transaction ex-
perience for remote peer j in peer i’s Local Service History Table, so peer i cannot
derive trust rating for peer j in its Local Trust Rating Table. This case is illustrated
in Table 4.2. In such case, the H-Trust infrastructure has to query other peers for the
necessary information over the network, i.e., to activate the trust query phase.
4.1.3 Trust Query
The trust query phase must rely on collective opinions from the other peers introduces
new challenges. When replying the query, a malicious peer may make false statements
about another peer’s service due to jealousy or other malicious motives. One trust and
reputation system has to accurately filter out such untrustworthy recommendation
opinions. Furthermore, the query phase is rather time consuming and possibly incurs
heavy overheads when high accuracy or updated reputation is desired. So the major
concerns with trust systems are guarantee the validity of opinions and reduce the
computing overload.
To address these issues, recommenders’ credibility factors must be introduced
and critically assessed. The feedback from those peers with higher credibility fac-
tors should be weighted more than those with lower credibility. Credibility factors
eliminate dishonest recommendation and prevent malicious peers from lying. To re-
duce the overload, the H-Trust system queries the whole network, yet only consider
partially qualified peers’ opinion, which are a subset of all the peers.
The credibility of the responses is evaluated according to the past records of the
respondents. The results of the past references of the other peers are recorded in
every peer’s Local Credibility Rating Table (LCRT) as shown in Table 4.3, which is
managed as the similar manner as the Local Service History Table. This means there
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Table 4.3: Local Credibility Rating Table





. . . . . .
are three tables in every local peer: Local Service History Table, Local Trust Rating
Table and Local Credibility Rating Table as shown in Figure 4.1. For any new joint
peer, the credibility factor is set as 5 (default value).
The query threshold is proposed in H-Trust to reduce the aggregation overload.
The query threshold T specifies the boundary of responses to be considered in a
queried trust calculation. It is set depending on network environment. When the M
responses to a trust query arrive, the querying peer account all the responses. Among
them, the N opinions from senders whose credibility rating are greater than T are
selected. In our illustrated example, peer i query to the network for peer j’s trust
rating, and it accounts all the replies. In this example, we set query threshold T=7,
and we get the qualified replies as shown by Figure 4.2.
4.1.4 Trust Aggregation
After filtering out opinions from dishonest peers by query threshold T, H-Trust then
further aggregates these opinions to yield a proper trust rating. Belonging to the
selective aggregation category, it aggregates the selective opinions obtained in the
trust query phase into local trust ratings.
H-Trust algorithm is inspired by Jorge E. Hirsch’s Hirsch Index (H-Index) con-
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Figure 4.1: Local Peer Record Architecture
tivity and the apparent scientific impact of a scientist, considering the set of the
scientist’s most cited papers and the number of citations that they have received in
other people’s publications [60].
We define H-Trust aggregation algorithm as follows. The basic concept is illus-
trated in Figure 4.3.
Definition 4.1 (H-Trust Aggregation) A peer i has trust rating Tij=H
towards peer j if H of the qualified N peers have at least trust rating
score H towards peer j, and the other (N-H) peers have at most trust
rating H towards peer j.
In our illustrated example, peer i first sorts all the obtained qualified replies by



























































Figure 4.2: Illustrated Example: Quelifitied Responses (Query Threshold=7)
Value equals to 41 as shown by Figure 4.4. One special case needs to be considered.
If there is no exactly H-Point, the approximate rank value will always be chosen as
H-Value. For instance, if only two peers replied with trust rating 95 and 90. The H-
Value should be 2 instead of 90. It is a good way to avoid cheating. It indicates that
too few recommendations are not reliable. So only when there are lots of responses
and all the replied value is high, H-Value could be high. The detail algorithm to find
H-Value is presented in [59].
After the H-Trust aggregation has been done, the H-Value will be set as peer j’s
trust rating score in peer i’s Local Trust Rating Table.
4.1.5 Peer Selection
Once a peer has computed trust ratings for the other peers interested in, it must
decide which to choose to start the transaction or service. If there is just only one
peer to provide the service, the question is whether to trust it with the service. If
multiple peers are offering the same service, the question is whether to select the peer
with the highest trust rating. Our solution is that the agent in the H-Trust system
























































Figure 4.3: H-Trust Calculation
selection threshold Ts which is determined by the service characters.
4.1.6 Update of Trust Rating and Credibility Factors
After each service cycle, the service starter makes record of the service. The record
is written back into start peer’s LSHT. And The Local Trust Rating Table will be
updated. In addition, the starter peer also updates its Local Credibility Table. Note
that, in trust query phase, M peers replied the query. No matter whether one peer’s
response was selected to use or not. We increase the credibility factor of peers who
gave correct recommendation, and decrease the credibility of peers who gave incorrect









































Figure 4.4: Illustrated Example: H-Trust Aggregation
4.1.7 Group Reputation Aggregation and Group Selection
In a current network environment, users perform large-scale and cooperative compu-
tational applications, and most computing jobs are accomplished by work groups like
P2P Grid Systems [61, 62, 63, 64]. However, nearly all the existing trust schemes and
reputation systems did not consider the group reputation issues for collaborative ap-
plications and resource sharing. To address these issues, we propose the idea of group
reputation. And group trust management systems will be implemented in S3Trust
system. S3Trust offers a robust reputation evaluation mechanism for both individ-
ual and group trusts with minimal communication and computation overheads. To
deal with the increasing network size, hierarchical trust scheme are proposed. Most
current trust schemes suffers from collusion behavior. Collusion problem should be
carefully studied in our proposed scheme.
The H-Trust personalized trust system developed by our group will be integrated
into TrustNet to as an alternative choice to provide accurate and fast trust rating.
Another goal in trust rating layer is to ensures good extension feature.
The primary purpose of the group reputation is to help a job distributor to decide
which available work group to assign the job. In an open environment, any bunch of
peers can form a group and provide services. A service distributor needs to distinguish
good service groups from bad ones. So group reputation mechanisms have been
proposed and implemented to guide such group selection.
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The definition of H-Trust group reputation aggregation algorithm is shown as
follows (illustrated in Figure 4.5).
Definition 4.2 (Group Reputation Aggregation) A peer i has trust
ratingTiG=HG towards group G if HG of all the NG peers in group G have
at least trust rating HG, and the other (NG-HG) peers have at most trust





















































Group Reputation Value HG: 
Rating Score = Peer Rank

































Figure 4.6: Illustrated Example: Group Reputation Aggregation
In our illustrated example, after the service distributor peer obtain all group
members’ trust ratings for one group. the service distributor first sorts all the group
members by trust rating, then it does linear search over the sorted table and finally
finds the H-Value equals to 62 as shown by Figure 4.6. After the group reputation
aggregation has been done, the H-Value will be set as the work group’s trust rating.
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If multiple peer groups offer the same resources, the job distributor would likely
go with the peer with the highest trust rating. The group selection can also be made
according to a certain criterion such as the quality of service. However, it is important
that the selection is not made according to a sole approach, which would result in
overloading the trusted peers. Note that, even when many groups are available, an
agent may decide to refuse all their service requests if all their reputations lie below the
selection threshold Ts. A selection threshold is necessary to protect against malicious
spam responses.
4.2 Trust Vector and VectorTrust Dissemination in P2P networks


































Figure 4.7: Trust Overlay Network. The vertices in the network correspond to peers
in a system. An directed edge shows the trust relation as trust rating and trust
direction. Each peer maintains a local trust table to store trust information.
VectorTrust system is built on a trust overlay network on the top of a P2P network.
Figure 4.7 shows a trust overlay network as a trust graph. The trust graph is a pair
G(V,E) where V = {v1, v2, ...vn} is the set of vertices (nodes in P2P network), and
E = {e1, e2, ...en} is the set of edges (trust relationship). The vertices in the network
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correspond to peers in a system. An edge directed from peer A to peer B if and only
if peer A was a client for peer B in a direct transaction/interaction and A has a direct
trust rating towards B. The value of the directed edge A to B reflects how much
A trusts B (TA,B = 1 indicates A 100% trusts B, TA,B = 0 indicates A never trusts
(totally distrust) B).
In VectorTrust, a personalized trust is propagated as a vector of trust rating and
direction, where trust rating is defined as a real number T, T ∈ [0, 1] and direction
is defined as a directed edge in the trust graph. This directed link with trust rating
is called Trust Vector (TV). The formal definition of trust vector is presented as
Definition 3.1. If peer A has a trust rating 0.7 on B, the trust vector is TA,B = 0.7 as
shown in Figure 4.8(a).
Definition 4.3 (Trust Vector): The trust vector is a vector of trust
rating and trust direction, where trust rating is defined as a real number
















(c) Most Trustable Path
Figure 4.8: Basic Definition
Note that the edge in a graph represents the rating for a combination of all direct
transactions between two peers. The trust rating value could be obtained by applying
different functions to consider all the history transactions’ importance, date, service
quality, etc. How to rate a service and how to generate the accurate direct trust
rating are not with the scope of this paper. Some typical approaches to calculate the
local trust ratings are given in [18, 17, 14].
Suppose A wishes to find a trust value for C. If A and C had prior transactions,
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then A can just look up the value of edge A→C. However, if A and C have never
had a prior transaction, A has to infer a trust value for C by using trust transfer.
Definition 4.4 (Trust Transfer): If peer i has a trust rating Ti,j to-
wards peer j, peer j has trust rating Tj,k towards peer k, then peer i has
indirect trust Ti,k = Ti,j × Tj,k towards peer k.
As shown by Figure 4.8(b), A has indirect trust TA,C towards C. TA,C = TA,B ×
TB,C = 0.7× 0.8 = 0.56.
There might be many trust paths from peer A to peer C. Given a set of paths
between A and C, A tends to choose the Most Trustable Path (MTP) to finish multi-
hop transactions with an unfamiliar peer C.
Definition 4.5 (Most Trustable Path): The most trustable path from
peer i to peer k is the trust path yielding highest trust rating Ti,k.
In vectortrust, the most trustable path can be computed as the maximal product
value of all directed edges along a path. And this product will be considered as A’s
trust rating towards C. In the example shown in Figure 4.8(c), the MTP is A→B→C,
and A infers a trust rating of TA,C = 0.56 towards C.
For each direct transaction in the system, participating peers generates a direct
trust link and assigns a trust rating to represent the quality of this transaction. For
example, consider a successful transaction between users peer A and B in which A
is the client of B. After the transaction completes, peer A assigns a trust rating to
reflect the quality of B’s service. And a new link starts from A with the arrow point
to the server B will be added in trust graph. A stores this rating in its trust table. So
each transaction in the system can either adds a new directed edge in the trust graph,
or relabels the value of an existing edge with its new trust value or a compound value
of both old and new trust ratings.
The trust table is required for each peer. As shown in Figure 4.9, it consist of the


















Figure 4.9: Sample Trust Table. A local trust table is maintained by each peer. The
table consist of the remote peer ID as entry, the trust rating, the next hop and the
total trust path length (optional) to reach the remote peer. Each entry shows only
the next hop instead of the whole trust path.
reach the remote peer. Each entry shows only the next hop instead of the whole trust
path. Besides of trust table, each peer has to make record for all its previous clients
ID set (H ′(i)) to be used in trust aggregation phase.
4.2.2 Trust Vector Aggregation Algorithm
In the initial stage of an evolving trust overlay network, direct trust ratings are
stored in local trust tables. However, the direct trust information is limited and
does not cover all potential interactions. For most peers without adequate direct
trust information, they have to use indirect trusts to start the process. We propose
the Trust Vector Aggregation Algorithm (TVAA) to infer and aggregate trust values
as presented in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, each trust path is aggregated to
MTP with most reliable trust rating towards a target peer by the value iteration
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process. Indirect trust information will be added to a trust table and be updated
as the aggregation process evolves. Note that, trust aggregation does not create
any new link in the trust overlay graph. Links are created or modified only after
direct transactions. The value iteration function used in Trust Vector Aggregation
Algorithm is given in function (4.9).
Ti,k = max(Ti,k, Ti,j × Tj,k) (4.1)
where Ti,k is the trust rating towards peer k given peer i’s local trust table, Ti,j is
the direct link trust and Tj,k is the received trust information towards peer k.
Algorithm 1 TVAA: Trust Vector Aggregation Algorithm (Peer i’s Point of View)
1: Initialize local trust tables.
2: for each TP time do
3: Find i’s direct precious clients set H ′(i).
4: if H ′(i) ̸= ∅, then
5: Send trust table request to those peers.
6: Receive incoming trust tables.
7: Relaxe each trust table entry by trust value iteration function (4.9), update
nexthop peers.
8: If receive any trust table request from other peers, send trust table back.
9: end if
10: end for
The algorithm is implemented based on distributed Bellman-Ford algorithm. Up-
dates are performed periodically where entire or part of a peer’s trust table is sent to
all its precious clients H ′(i) every Tp time. On receiving an update from a neighbor,
each peer relax the trust ratings by value iteration function to all possible peers and
updates its own trust table to reflect any changes, and then include relevant neighbors
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(b) Indirect Trust Path
Figure 4.10: Direct V.S. Indirect Trust Path. In VectorTrust, the direct experience is
considered more important because that VectorTrust is a designed as a personalized
trust scheme. The peer tends to believe their own experiences more than recommen-
dations.
A special case needs to be considered. If peer A has a direct trust vector to
another peer B as shown in Figure 4.10(a), although the trust rating is lower than an
indirect path (shown in Figure 4.10(b)). VectorTrust still considers the direct trust
as the most trustable path. That is, in VectorTrust, the direct experience cannot be
replaced by indirect trust inference. Evidence is not as valuable as direct experience.
However, this criterion can be relaxed or modified depending on needs of applications.
We consider the direct trust more important because that VectorTrust is a designed
as a personalized trust scheme. In personalized trust rating systems, the peer has
self-policing trust on other peers, and the peer tends to believe their own experiences
more than recommendations.
We present below an illustrated example to ease the understanding of TVAA
operations.
Illustrated Example. Consider a network with 6 peers A, B, C, D, E and F
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as shown in Figure 4.7. We illustrate the evolution of the trust table in Figure 4.11,
where T denotes the current time (or iteration). In the figure, at each iteration, a
new trust rating item is highlighted with a darker color.
(a) Peer A, T=0 (b) Peer B, T=0 (c) Peer C, T=0 (d) Peer D, T=0 (e) Peer E, T=0 (f) Peer F, T=0
(g) Peer A, T=1 (h) Peer B, T=1 (i) Peer C, T=1 (j) Peer D, T=1 (k) Peer E, T=1 (l) Peer F, T=1
(m) Peer A,
T=2
(n) Peer B, T=2 (o) Peer C, T=2 (p) Peer D, T=2 (q) Peer E, T=2 (r) Peer F, T=2
(s) Peer A, T=4 (t) Peer B, T=4 (u) Peer C, T=4 (v) Peer D, T=4 (w) Peer E, T=4 (x) Peer F, T=4
Figure 4.11: Illustrated VectorTrust Aggregation Example. At time T = 0, the
original trust tables are constructed according to the direct experiences which are
shown by Figure 4.7. The aggregation begins at time T = 0. New trust rating items
to local trust tables are added with trust propagation process going on. At time
T = 4, the trust aggregation process stops and results in a convergence status. The
convergence speed is 4 time steps/iterations in this case.
At time T = 0, the original trust tables are constructed according to the direct
experience and are shown in Figure 4.11(a) to 4.11(f). The aggregation begins at
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time T = 0.
At this point, all peers (A,B,C,D,E,F ) send their trust tables to all their previous
clients: A to D, B to A and E, C to B, E, and F , D to A, E to C and D, and F to
C and E. As each of these neighbors receives this information, they recalculate the
trust ratings.
For example, A receives a trust table from B that tells A there is a trust path
via B to C, with a trust rating of TB,C = 0.8. Since the current trust rating to B is
TA,B = 0.7, then A knows it has a trust path to C that is TA,C = TA,B × TB,C = 0.56.
In the similar way, A learns that it has a trust path to E via D with trust rating
TA,E = 0.36. As there are no other trust paths that A knows about, it puts these
trust ratings into its local trust table as shown in Figure 4.11(g). Similarly, all peers
except E have gained new trust information at Time T = 1 shown in Figure 4.11(g)
to 4.11(l).
Then all peers broadcast their trust vectors to their previous clients again. This
prompts each peer to re-calculate their trust tables. For instance, A receives a trust
table from B that tells A there is a path via B to E, with a trust rating TB,E = 0.72.
Since A’s current trust rating to B is TA,B = 0.7, then A knows it has a path to E via
B that with trust rating TA,E = TA,B × TB,E = 0.504 which greater than the existing
trust rating to E via D. At this time, A will replace the old trust rating to E with
the new rating TA,E = 0.504 via B as shown in Figure 4.11(m).
The process proceeds. At time T = 4, none has any new trust information in their
tables. Therefore, none receives any new information that might yield any better trust
path than it already has. So the algorithm stops and results in a convergence status.
Therefore, in this case, the convergence speed is 4 time steps/iterations.
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4.3 Trust Aggregation in Cyclic Mobile Environment
4.3.1 Trust Graph in CMANETs
In CMANETs, nodes have short radio range, high mobility, and uncertain connec-
tivity. Two nodes are able to communicate only when they reach each others’ trans-
mission range. When two nodes meet at a particular time, they have a contract




























(f) T = 50
Figure 4.12: CMANET Movement Trace Snapshots for One System Cycle (CS = 60)
The cyclic movement trace graph of a CMANET consisting of three nodes is
shown in Figure 4.12. The unit time is set as 10. Each peer i moving cyclically
has motion cycle time Ci. We can tell from the trace that CA = 30, CB = 30 and
CC = 20. The system motion cycle time CS is the Least Common Multiple (LCM)
of all the peers’ motion cycle time in the network, CS = lcm(CA, CB, CC) = 60. Note
that, CMANETs movement traces are not required to be following some shapes. The
“cyclic” is explained that if two nodes meet at time T0, they have a high probability
to meet after every particular time period TP . We represent the movement traces in
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Figure 4.13: Trust Graph. The vertices in the graph correspond to peer states (time
and location) in a system. An directed solid edge shows the initial trust relation (as
trust rating and trust direction) and contact time. The dashed line shows the nodes’
movement trace. Each peer maintains a local trust table to store trust information.
To describe the CMANETs system features and trust relationships, we combine
the snapshot graph and trust relationships into a directed trust graph as shown in
Figure 4.13. Each node is represented by several states based on periodically ap-
pearing locations as the vertices in graph. We represent the states Xi as i/Ti{Loc}
where i is the node ID and Ti{Loc} is appearance time for particular locations. The
appearance time is give by,
Ti{Loc} = T0i{Loc}+ Ci × n(n = 0, 1, 2, . . .) (4.2)
where T0i{Loc} is the first time node i appears at this location and Ci is node i’s
motion cycle time. For example, node A appears at three locations. So in trust graph,
node A is represented by three states: A/TA{Loc0}, A/TA{Loc1} and A/TA{Loc2}.
Following Equation (4.2), we have, TA{Loc0} = 0 + CA × n = 30n, TA{Loc1} =
10 + CA × n = 10 + 30n, TA{Loc2} = 20 + CA × n = 20 + 30n, (n = 0, 1, 2, . . .). The
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three states generated by node A is A/30n,A/(10 + 30n), A/(20 + 30n). State Xi’s
one hop direct trust neighbors is represented by the set H ′(Xi), e.g., H
′(B/30n) =
{A/30n,C/(10+20n)}. The directed dashed lines between states shows nodes’ move-
ment trace as state transfer edges in trust graph.
The initial trust relationships are shown by the solid directed edges in the graph.
There is an edge directed from peer i to peer j if and only if i has a trust rating on
j. The value Ri,j(Ri,j ∈ [0, 1]) reflects how much i trusts j where Ri,j = 0 indicates i
never/distrust trust j, Ri,j = 1 indicates i fully trust j. The trust between different
states of the same node i is considered as Ri,i = 1.
The trust rating is personalized which means the peer has self-policing trust on
other peers, rather than obtaining a global reputation value for each peer. We adopt
personalized trust rating because in an open and decentralized CMANET environ-
ment, peers will not have any centralized infrastructure to maintain a global reputa-
tion. The solid trust rating value on the edge could be obtained by applying different
functions to consider all the history transactions’ importance, date, service quality
between two peers. How to rate a service and how to generate and normalize the
accurate direct trust ratings are not with the scope of this paper. In this paper, we
assume the normalized trust ratings have been generated. What we studied in this
paper is the trust aggregation/propagation process in an ad hoc network with high
mobility.
Besides trust ratings, each edge is also labeled by a time function showing when
two nodes can communicate by this trust link. The appearance time for each link is
given by Equation (4.3):
TRi,j = T0Ri,j + lcm(Ci, Cj)× n(n = 0, 1, 2, . . .) (4.3)
Where Ci, Cj is the relevant nodes’ motion cycle time and T0Ri,j is the first time
they meet by this link. The solid edges are represented as Ri,j/TRi,j . The system
trust graph shows all the trust relationships, the moving trace and possible contacts
36
of the network. For example, setting T = 0 at Figure 4.13, we obtain the snapshot
trace as in Figure 4.12(a) and the appearing trust links.
4.3.2 Trust Path Finding Problems in CMANET
In cTrust system, each peer maintains a local trust table. The trust table consists of
the remote peer ID as entry, the trust rating for each possible remote peer, the next
hop to reach the remote peer. Each entry shows only the next hop instead of the
whole trust path. Initially, peers’s trust tables only contain the trust information of
their one hop direct experience.
Due to the communication range and power constrains, peers are not able to
communicate with remote peers directly. Suppose peer i wishes to start a transaction
with remote peer k. i wishes to infer an indirect trust rating for peer k to check k’s
reputation. In cTrust, the trust transfer is defined as follows.
Ri,j and Rj,k can be both direct and indirect trust. Beside the trust rating, peer i
also wishes to find a trustable path and depend on the multi-hop communication to
finish this transaction. Among a set of paths between i and k, i tends to choose the
Most Trustable Path (MTP).
MTP is computed as the maximal ⊗ production value of all directed edges along
a path. And this production will be considered as i’s trust rating towards peer k.
The MTP provides a trustable communication path, and is used to launch multi-hop
transactions with an unfamiliar target peer. cTrust scheme solves the trust rating
transfer and MTP finding problems in CMANETs.
4.3.3 Markov Decision Process Model
Markov Decision Process (MDP) is a discrete time stochastic control process con-
sisting of a set of states. In each state there are several actions to choose. For a
state x and an action a, the state transition function Px,x′ determines the transition
37
probabilities to the next state. A reward is also earned for each state transition. We
model the MTP finding process as a MDP. We propose value iteration to solve the
MTP finding problem.
Theorem 4.1: The MTP finding process is a Markov Decision Process.
Proof:
Initially, for a sequence of random node states in trust graph X1, X2, X3, . . . , Xt, the
trust path has the following relation:
Pr(Xt+1 = x|X1 = x1, X2 = x2..., Xt = xt)
= Pr(Xt+1 = x|Xt = xt) (4.4)
Equation 4.4 indicates the state transitions of a trust path possess the markov property: the
future states depend only on the present state, and are independent of past states.
The components required in a MDP are defined by the following notations:
• S: state space of MDP, the node state set in the trust graph.
• A: action set of MDP, the state transition decisions.
• Px,x′ = Pr(Xt+1 = x′|Xt = x, at = a): the probability that action a in node state x at
time t will lead to node x′ at time t+ 1.
• Rx,x′ : the reward received after transition to state x′ from state x with transition
probability Px,x′. Rx,x′ is in terms of trust rating in out scheme.
The state transition probability in state x to state x′ is computed from normalizing all x’s
out trust links (trust ratings).
Px,x′ = Pr(Xt+1 = x





In each node state, the next state probability sums to one. The trust path finding process is
a stochastic process that all state transitions are probabilistic.
The goal is to maximize the cumulative trust rating for the whole path, typically the
expected production from the source peer to the destination peer.
γRs1,s2 ⊗ γ2Rs2,s3 ⊗ γ3Rs3,s4 ⊗ ...⊗ γtRst,st+1 (4.6)
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where γ is the discount rate and satisfies 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. It is typically close to 1.
Therefore, the MTP finding process is a MDP (S,A, P.,., R.,.).
The solution to this MDP can be expressed as a trust path π (MTP), The standard
algorithms to calculate the policy π is the value iteration process.
4.3.4 Value Iteration
Section 4.3.2 presents the trust transfer function Ri,k = Ri,j ⊗Rj,k. The upper bound
for Ri,j ⊗ Rj,k is min(Ri,j, Rj,k) because the combination of trust cannot exceed any
original trust. Ri,j ⊗ Rj,k should be larger than Ri,j × Rj,k, which avoid a fast trust
rating dropping in trust transfer. The discount rate γ(γ ∈ [0, 1]) determines the
importance of remote trust information. The trust transfer function Ri,j ⊗Rj,k needs
to meet the following condition:
Ri,j × γRj,k ≤ Ri,j ⊗Rj,k ≤ min(Ri,j , γRj,k) (4.7)
In cTrust scheme, we set the trust transfer function as:
Ri,j ⊗Rj,k = min(Ri,j , γRj,k)× na
√
max(Ri,j , γRj,k) (4.8)
We prove that the given function meets the condition in (4.7).
Proof:
max(Ri,j , γRj,k) ≤ 1, so,min(Ri,j , γRj,k)× na
√
max(Ri,j , γRj,k) ≤ min(Ri,j , γRj,k)















≥ Ri,j × γRj,k
Therefore, we have proved that the trust transfer function (4.8) meets the condition (4.7).
By setting up the adjusting factor na(na=1, 2, 3...), (Ri,j ⊗ Rj,k) can be sliding
between the upper and lower bound.
In each round of the iteration, the trust table of each node is updated by choosing
an action (next hop state in trust graph). The value iteration is executed concurrently
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for all nodes. It compares the new information with the old trust information and
makes a correction to the trust tables based on the new information. The trust tables
associated with the nodes are updated iteratively and until they converge. Based on











where Ri,k is the trust rating towards peer k given peer i’s local trust table, Ri,j
is the direct link trust and Rj,k is the received trust information towards peer k.
α(α ∈ [0, 1]) is the learning rate. The learning rate determines to what extent the
newly acquired trust information will replace the old trust rating. A learning rate
α = 0 indicates that the node does not learn anything, and a learning rate factor
α = 1 indicates that the node fully trusts and learns the new information. At the
convergence status of the value iteration, each peer’s trust table will contain the trust
rating for MTP.
4.3.5 cTrust Distributed Trust Aggregation Algorithm
In the initial stage of an evolving CMANET, pre-set direct trust ratings are stored
in local trust tables. However, the direct trust information is limited and does not
cover all potential interactions. The distributed trust aggregation algorithm gathers
trust ratings to any peer in a network (Algorithm 2). In this algorithm, each trust
path is aggregated to MTP with highest trust rating towards target peer. Indirect
trust information will be added to trust tables and be updated as the aggregation
process evolves. The algorithm is implemented based on distributed Bellman-Ford
algorithm. Updates are performed periodically where peers retrieve one of their direct
trust neighbors’ trust tables and replace existing trust ratings with more higher ones
in local trust tables,then include relevant neighbors as the next hops.
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Algorithm 2 Distributed Trust Aggregation Algorithm in CMANETs
1: Initialize local trust tables.
2: for each time slot do
3: for peer i ∈ CMANET do
4: Find i’s direct trust neighbor set H ′(i).
5: if H ′(i) ̸= ∅, then
6: Normalize transition probability by Equation (4.5).
7: Decide one target node j by transition probability in set H ′(i)
8: Send trust table request toj (The contact between i and j is based on their
contact probability P).
9: Receive incoming trust tables.
10: Relaxe each trust table entry by trust value iteration function (4.9), update
nexthop peers.







5.1 Trust Spanning Tree
In TrustNet, the trust reachability is defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Trust Reachability): Peer j is trust reachable from peer i if
there is a trust path that has higher trust rating than a trust threshold from i to j.
In a trust graph, directed trust vectors merely show a binary neighbor relationship,
for instance, whether Node A is connected to Node B. To have a better understanding
on the trust relationships beyond one hop away and gain more insight on the trust
landscape, it’s desirable for a peer/node to be able to obtain knowledge about its
multi-hop outreach scope with some trust constraints. To this end, we introduce
the concept of trust spanning tree to represent the outreach scope of a peer to its
trustable peers with a pre-defined trust threshold θ.
Definition 5.2 (Trust Spanning Tree): In TrustNet, peer i’s trust spanning
tree is a tree with a maximal set of trustable peers that i can reach. The trust threshold
θ limits the minimum inferred trust rating from the root to other peers within the tree.
Trust spanning tree can be easily constructed using Depth-First Search (DFS) or
Breadth-First Search (BFS).
5.2 Trust Transitive Closure
The trust spanning tree answers the reachability scope problem for each peer in
TrustNet. From the system’s point of view, the system manager may also wish to
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know the reachability characteristic for the entire network. In other words, we want
to find out whether there exists a reliable trust path between two randomly picked
peers. This knowledge is very useful in designing and improving a trust system.
Inspired by the concept of transitive closure in graph theory, we propose the concept
of Trust Transitive Closure.
Definition 5.3 (Trust Transitive Closure): Consider a trust graph G(V,E),
where V is the set of peers and E is the set of direct trust links. The Trust Transitive
Closure (TTC) with a trust threshold θ of trust graph G is a sub-graph G’(θ)=(V,E’)
such that for all v,w in V there is a trust link (v,w) in E’ if and only if there exists a
path from v to w in G and the trust rating Tvw ≥ θ in G.
A B C D E
0.9 0.8 0.60.7
(a) Original Trust Graph







(b) TTC (θ unspecified)














A B C D E
0.9 0.8
(f) TTC (θ=0.8)
Figure 5.1: Trust Transitive Closure
We illustrate the TTC concept through an example shown in Figure 5.1. With
various trust thresholds, we have different sets of closures. Naturally, we observe that
with higher trust threshold, the size of the closure decreases, which reflects the fact
that each peer has a relatively smaller highly trustable cliques. The trust transitive
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closure reflects the trust connectivity level of a trust overlay network. For a pre-set
trust threshold, a network with larger TTC and more trust closure links is generally
considered more trust stable than network with small trust closure and trust links.
Keeping a network trust connected, the maximum trust threshold is defined as the
network’s trust threshold. For example, in Figure 5.1, the network’s trust threshold
is θ=0.6. If we increase the trust threshold to θ=0.7, the network will loss the trust
connectivity to peer E, which indicates that peer E is not trustable for trust threshold
θ=0.7.
Algorithm 3 Trust Transitive Closure Computation Algorithm
1: Represent a trust graph in an adjacency matrix adjmat[max][max]
2: Copy the adjacency matrix into another matrix trust[max][max]
3: for i = 0; i <max; i++ do
4: for j = 0; j < max; j++ do
5: if trust[i][j] ≥ θ then
6: for k = 0; k < max; k++ do
7: if trust[i][j] * trust[j][k] ≥ θ then






The data structure of TTC is typically stored as a matrix. That is, ifmatrix[i][j] =
T , then it is the case that node i can reach node j through one or more hops with
a inferred trust rating T . After the construction of trust transitive closures, in O(1)
steps one can determine whether node i is reachable from node j with a trust rating
higher than the threshold θ. Our algorithm for computing the trust transitive closure
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in TrustNet is derived from Floyd-Warshall algorithm as computing the transitive
closure of a graph. The detailed procedure is presented in Algorithm 3.
5.3 Incentive Mechanisms
5.3.1 Problem Formulation
System Model. We assume a homogeneous hash-indexed file sharing P2P system
without any centralized trust or centralized infrastructure. No peers are pre-trusted.
A feedback based reputation system exists in such a environment. We represent
the file download/sharing interactions as transactions. After transactions, peers are
required by the reputation schemes to submit their feedback messages such as provider
identifier, client identifier, feedbacks (rating and evaluation metrics) to other peers
based on their node identifier.
Peer Model. We assume most of the peers are strategic in the system, i.e., peers
behave rationally to maximize their own welfare. Peers are able to change their be-
havior independently. Each transacting client is responsible for submitting feedbacks
on performance (“successful” or “failed”) of their mutual transaction. To simulate
some unpredictable behavior in real P2P network, we allow peers to randomly adopt
some irrational reporting activities (regardless of the payoff) with a low probability.
Security Issues. Cryptographic mechanisms such as Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) is used to protect the authentication, integrity and non repudiation of feed-
backs. Upon registering in the P2P system, peers are required to create their own
certificates based on public-private key pairs. The certificates must be signed by the
system, i.e., a certain number of peers in the system. The report message of a peer is
encrypted with the secret key and uniquely bonding to its identity. Peers that receive
feedback message are able to verify the senders and the integrity of messages. Peers
only accept valid feedback messages with a valid signature signed by sender’s private


















Figure 5.2: The Truthful Feedback Problem for Non-Verifiable Information. For the
querist Q, the transaction type is “hidden knowledge”. Q issues a query to R to
reveal the real transaction type. The feedback from R is non-verifiable information
for Q.
Truthful Feedback Reinforcement Problem. As shown in Figure 5.2, the
reporter R knows the type (“successful” or “failed”) after he finishes the transaction
(e.g., file downloading). In the network, a third party peer holding the transaction
history records may want to reveal the transaction type to maintain reputation ratings
for the transacted peers. For the querist Q, the transaction type is “hidden knowl-
edge”. Q issues a query to R to reveal the real transaction type. However, without
appropriate incentives, reporter R may not choose to report truth. In addition, the
feedback from a reporter R is usually not verifiable. That is, it is hard for querist
Q to verify whether reporter R is telling the truth without querying peer T . Even if
it queries T , it is still hard for peer Q to judge if R and T are telling the truth. In
this case, the objective verification is extremely hard if not impossible. This is the
non-verifiable feedback problem/dillema in reputation systems.
The reputation system’s basic concern is to obtain the truthful feedbacks on the
non-verifiable information environment. To achieve this goal, inspired by the mecha-
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nism design paradigm in a hidden knowledge setting [65, 66], we model the feedback
reporting process as a reporting game. We design a wage-based incentive mechanism
and provide numerical solutions to obtain the minimum wage required to reinforce the
truthful strategies. Under our mechanism, querists are not required to estimate/know
truthfulness of feedbacks when paying wage. The wage paid to reporters only depends
on the feedbacks regardless of truthfulness. By following our scheme, truthful rev-
elation will be a dominant strategy for all reporters. Different from most of the
comparison based schemes, our proposed solution does not require peers to verify the
information truthfulness. That is, the scheme does not require the peers to compare
the feedback submission with other feedbacks. The solution requires only localized
wage payment schemes, which greatly reduce the risk of collusion in reporting.
5.3.2 The Game Design
To aid the presentation and analysis, we define the notations to be used throughout
the paper as shown in Table 5.1. We assume the output q, the transmission effort c,
the querist’s utility UQ, reporter’s utility UR and social utility US can be evaluated
and expressed by a currency (credit) system. The reporter’s feedback message is
represented by m (m ∈ {successful, failed}). P is the probability that a transaction
to be successful in a network. It is obtained by surveying the network before we
deploy the wage-based incentive mechanism protocol. E.g., in a network where 50%
transactions turn out to be successful, P should be set up as P = 0.5. We ordinarily
assume that reporting nodes have no moral sense. They act to maximize their own
welfare. The querying node must design a mechanism that provides incentive for
truthful reporting. We model the feedback reporting process as a report game as
shown below. In our game, the real transaction type T could be “successful” or
“failed”. The querist sets up game rules, and it hopes to employ an honest reporting




T The real transaction type, T ∈
{successful, failed}
m Reporter feedback message, m ∈
{successful, failed}
w The wage paid to reporter (ws for message m =
successful, wf for message m = failed)
q Querist output (qs for message m = successful,
qf for message m = failed)
α Cost factor (αs if T = successful, αf if T =
failed)
c Reporter’s effort (c = q/αs if T = successful,
c = q/αf if T = failed)





game or not enter the game. If an agent joins the game as a reporter, it has to obey
the game rules. A reporter reports the transaction type as “successful” or “failed”.
The querist then assigns report wages to complete one reporting cycle. The wage
payment function only depends on the report message m.
The Reporting Game
• Players
The querist Q and the reporter R.
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• The Game Procedure
– The querist offers the reporter a wage contract w(q,m) (q is output and
m is the report message sending by the reporter). The reporter is paid ws
if it reports m = successful, wf if it reports m = failed.
– The reporter accepts or rejects the querist’s offer.
– The transaction state T = successful with probability P and T = failed
with probability (1−P ). The reporter observes the type of the transaction,
but the querist does not.
– If the reporter accepted the contract, it costs c2 ((c = q/αs) to send report
message if T = successful, (c = q/αf ) to send report message if T =
failed). The effort is unobserved by the querist.
– Querist’s output is qs for message m = successful and qf for message
m = failed. And the wage is paid.
• Utility
If the reporter rejects the contract, UR = 0 and UQ = 0;
If the reporter accepts the contract, UR = w − c2 and UQ = q − w;
US = UQ + UR.
At the time of signing a contract, information is symmetric. The reporter does
not know what type the transaction will be and what he is going to report at the
point which he must accept or reject the contract. But the information becomes
asymmetric later after the game begins. Reporter knows the real transaction type
which is “hidden knowledge” and non-verifiable information for querist. The problem
for the querist is to design a contract that 1) induces the reporter to make a truthful




We present solutions on how to construct an optimal contract for a querist to retrieve
truthful information observable by a reporter and unverifiable by a querist in the
reporting game. The contract is a set of rules that querist designs and reporter accepts
in order to convey information from the reporter to the querist. The contract contains
a mapping from each possible report to some action (querist’s output and reporter’s
wage in this game) by the querist. In a specific homogeneous system, to ease the
deployment, all the reporters and querists share the same contract. However, multi-
contacts solutions can also be considered to achieve better performance. The contract
is implemented as a feedback message protocol in a reputation system. The contract
offer is a mechanism for getting the reporter to truthfully report the transaction type.
Considering the querist, its utility function equals to its output subtracts the wage
paid to reporter in both “successful” and “failed” states,
UQ = [P (qs − ws) + (1− P )(qf − wf )] (5.1)
The querist aims to maximize its own utility, so it must solve the maximization
problem in its utility function,
Maximize(UQ) (5.2)
In this game, the incentive compatibility constraints includes two aspects, the
participation constraint and the self-selection constraint. The contract must satisfy
one participation constraint so that the reporter will accept the offer. Self-selection
constraints are also required so that the reporter will report the truth. For the
reporter, the participation constraint is if it tells the truth, its earnings (utility) must
be more than or at least equal to 0. Or the reporters will not have motivation to
join the game. That is, the reporter hopes to earn some credits by joining the game.
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Therefore, the participation constraint can be represented as,













)2 ≥ 0 (5.3)
To maximize it own utility, the querist wants to offer the reporter as little wage














)2 = 0 (5.4)
In the game, the reporter is paid under one of two options, ws if it reports m =
successful and wf if it reports m = failed. To ensure the reporter telling the truth,
reporting the false type for a transaction must result in a low payoff. Since the querist
cannot verify the message, the contracts itself must induce reporter self-select truth
message to report. In this game, the two self-selection constraints are that if the
transaction type is “successful”, the report’s utility sending m = successful must be
more than or at least equal to the utility sending m = failed message,












And if the transaction type is “failed”, the report’s utility sending m = failed
must be more than or at least equal to the utility sending m = successful message,













In reputation system, we care more for “failed” transaction than “successful”
transaction. In a system where we do not care for the report truthfulness for the
“successful” transaction, the querist is not willing to increase the wage any more
than necessary, so the “successful” state’s self-selection constraint in Equation (5.5)












Solving Equation (5.4) and Equation (5.7) yields,


















Return to the querist utility maximization problem, substituting wf and ws, we
rewrite Equation (5.1) as,
UQ = P
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Finally, the wage combination that reinforces the truthful reporting is given by,
ws =











The optimal wage is decided by environment parameters αs, αf and transaction
state T ’s probability distribution P . With the optimal wage, we can also obtain
querist’s maximum utility and reporter’s utility,
UQ =
Pα2s − Pα2f + α2f
4
(5.17)
UR = 0 (5.18)
The reporter does not any earn information rents. Statistically, for the reporters’
population or a large enough reporting rounds. the overall expected reporters’ utility
is 0 because of the single participation constraint is lower-bounded to 0 in Equation
(5.4). The querists pay the reporters as little as it can be to achieve own maximum
utility. However, for a single reporter at specific time, the utility could be more than
or less than zero. Reporters will join this kind of game, trying to gain positive utility.
To encourage the participation of more reporters, the querists could slightly increase
the wage, which leads to UR > 0.
5.3.4 Integration with Reputation Systems
The proposed wage-based incentive mechanism could be integrated to the some exist-
ing reputation systems as an additional message feedback protocol layer. Some typical
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incentive compatible reputation systems we are currently working on is [18, 19, 20, 21].
The reporting game is implemented as a message feedback protocol in reputation sys-
tems. All the peers who joint the game have to follow the protocol format to send
a feedback message. Feedback messages failing to follow the protocol will not be
accepted by the system. PKI system is used to protect the authentication, integrity
and non repudiation of feedbacks. Upon registering in the wage-based incentive game
system, each peer is required to create their own certificates based on public-private
key pairs. With a certificate, querying peer that receives feedback message is able to
verify the identity of a reporter in the game. The querying peer only accepts valid
feedback messages from a node within the wage-based incentive mechanism protocol.
In the wage-based incentive mechanism, after transactions, peers are required by
the reputation schemes to provide their feedback messages with provider identifier,
client identifier and feedbacks signed by their own identifiers. The feedback message
includes transaction performance (“successful” or “failed”) and additional evaluation
metrics. The message cost (c), the output (q) and wage (w) is determined by the re-
porting protocol. The cost could be energy consumption correspond to a real system,
which could be corresponded to distance. That is, for every message the reporter
sent, there is energy cost.
The cost, output, wage and peers’ utility should be evaluated and represented
by a universal credit/currency scheme. The incentive protocol including the feed-
back message format, the credit/currency schemes, and additional protocol rules are





6.1 Simulate H-Trust in P2P Environment
Figure 6.1: User Inferface of the Simulator
In this section, we evaluate the performance of H-Trust through simulation. The
simulation is developed using NetLogo, a popular multi-agent simulation tool in the
AI community [67]. We use this simulator because its evaluating metrics meet our
needs and it was used to model some existing schemes [36]. Thus, using NetLogo
allows us to compare our algorithms with others.
The screenshot of the user interface of the simulator is shown in Figure ??. On
the left side, it lists a set of tuning bars that users can configure and adjust system
parameters, including network size, percentage of malicious peers, percentage of low-
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Table 6.1: Simulation Parameter Setting (H-Trust)
Notation Environment Parameter Default Value
N Network size 100,500
α Malicious peer percentage 10%,40%
µr Initial trust rating distribution
mean value
25,75
σ2r Initial trust rating distribution
variance
10
µc Initial credibility factor distribu-
tion mean value
5
σ2c Initial trust rating distribution
variance
1
θv Peer voting threshold 50%
credibility peers, and others. The simulated network is in the central panel, showing
the P2P Desktop Grid network behavior. In the panel, the green shapes represent
the normal peers and red ones the malicious peers. The circles represent peers with
normal credits, while the triangles are peers with very low credibility that always
make dishonest recommendations. On the right side, it lists three plotting panels
that illustrate results as simulations evolve.
The basic parameter setting and default values used in the simulation are sum-
marized in Table 6.3. The network is configured as 100 nodes and 500 nodes, with
malicious peer percentage (α) varying from 10% to 40%. For honest peers, the initial
trust value follows a normal distribution with mean µr = 75 and variance σ
2
r = 10. For
malicious peers, initial trust value follows a normal distribution with mean µr = 25
and variance σ2r = 10. The initial credibility factor value follows a normal distribution
with mean µc = 7.5 and variance σ
2
c = 1. We use a voting threshold of θv = 50%
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which means one peer is identified malicious if more than 50% of eligible peers vote
it as malicious.
The primary metrics we use to assess the performance of the reputation system are
“the percentage of malicious services” and “The detection rate of malicious peers”.
The initial experiments are done simulating a network with 100 peers where 10% of
the peers are malicious and 10% of the peers have bad credibility. The simulation of a
P2P grid network proceeds in simulation cycles: each simulation cycle is subdivided
into a number of service distribution cycles. In each service cycle, a peer in the
network may be actively submitting a job. When distributing a job, a peer waits for
incoming responses, selects a most reputable peer to distribute the job. When a job
cycle completes, the peer inserts a new transaction record to its History Table.
(a) Malicious Service vs. Total
Service
(b) Malicious Service Percent-
age vs. Time
(c) The Detection Rate of Ma-
licious Peers
Figure 6.2: 100 Nodes Simulation (Malicious Peer Percentage=10%)
The simulation results are shown in Figure 6.2. The computed trust ratings
accurately reflect each peer’s actual behavior. The number of malicious services
starts to decrease with time.
As shown in Figure 6.2 (c), as time goes by, peers in the network gradually isolate
malicious peers by votes and finally identify malicious peers. This procedure is also
shown in Figure 6.3 (Red dots represent malicious peers. Big dots indicate peers that
are identified as malicious peers).
In the second set of experiments, we keep the network size as 100 nodes where 10%
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 6.3: Malicious Peers are Identified
(a) Malicious Service vs. Total
Service
(b) Malicious Service Percent-
age vs. Time
(c) The Detection Rate of Ma-
licious Peers vs. Time
Figure 6.4: 100 Nodes Simulation (Malicious Peer Percentage=40%)
of the peers have bad credibility. However, the percentage of malicious peers increases
up to 40% which means there are lots of more malicious peers in the network. In
Figure 6.4, the simulation results demonstrate that the system functions well in the
network when a large part of nodes are malicious.
To test the H-Trust performance in large-scale networks, we increase the network
size to 500 peers in the third set of experiments. The percentage of malicious peers
is set as 10% and 40% as we did in previous experiment. The simulation results are
shown in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6.
We observe that in a larger network, H-Trust still functions well and the conver-
gence time increases in a reasonable range duo to more iteration complexity caused by
larger-scale networks. Both results demonstrate that the H-Trust system detects most
of the malicious peers after aggregation iterations. On average, the peers transmit
modest messages and incur acceptable communication overheads.
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(a) Malicious Service vs. Total
Service
(b) Malicious Service Percent-
age vs. Time
(c) The Detection Rate of Ma-
licious Peers
Figure 6.5: 500 Nodes Simulation (Malicious Peer Percentage=10%)
(a) Malicious Service vs. Total
Service
(b) Malicious Service Percent-
age vs. Time
(c) The Detection Rate of Ma-
licious Peers
Figure 6.6: 500 Nodes Simulation (Malicious Peer Percentage=40%)
6.2 Simulate VectorTrust Dissemination in P2P Networks
We evaluate the performance of VectorTrust through simulation. We designed an
event-driven simulator prototype VTSim using NetLogo, a popular multi-agent sim-
ulation engine [67]. We start with description of simulation setup and primary proce-
dures. Performance metrics are then defined and results in terms of each metric are
presented and discussed. At the end of this section, we present a thorough summary
of the existing trust and reputation schemes.
6.2.1 Simulation Setup and Procedure
The basic parameter setting and default values used in the simulation are summarized
in Table 6.3. The network is configured from 100 nodes to 1000 nodes, with malicious
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Table 6.2: Simulation Parameter Setting (VectorTrust)
Notation Environment Parameter Default Value
N Network size 100,200 to 1000(step by
200)
D Average peer outdegree 3,6,9
α Malicious peer percentage 10%,30%,50%
µr Initial trust rating distribution mean
value
0.25,0.75
σ2r Initial trust rating distribution vari-
ance
0.1
µD Peer outdegree distribution mean value 3,6,9 (D)
σ2D Peer outdegree variance 1
γ Trust rating variance threshold 0.02 to 0.20
λ Expected number of new transaction
occurrences in unit service interval
10 to 50(step by 10)
θv Peer voting threshold 50%
ϵ ϵ-convergence threshold 0.02
peer percentage (α) varying from 10% to 50%. For honest peers, the initial trust value
follows a normal distribution with mean µr = 0.75 and variance σ
2
r = 0.1. For mali-
cious peers, initial trust value follows a normal distribution with mean µr = 0.25 and
variance σ2r = 0.1. The initial trust relationship (in terms of trust link in trust graph)
follows random distribution as shown in Figure 6.7. The trust network complexity is
represented in terms of nodes’ trust outdegree D. A network complexity with D = 6
indicates that the initial nodes’ trust outdegrees follow a normal distribution with
mean µD = 6 and variance σ
2
D = 1. Figure 6.8 shows network trust density with
network trust complexity D=3, 6, and 9 (red points represent malicious peers). Note
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Figure 6.7: Trust Links Distribution (Only distribution function is shown here, detail
parameter setting is summarized in Table 6.3)
that, the links in Figure 6.8 shows the initial direct trust relation between peers. In
malicious peer detection experiment, we use a voting threshold of θv = 50% which
means one peer is identified malicious if more than 50% of eligible peers vote it as
malicious. And for a candidate peer A, the eligible voting peers is defined as the peer
set that has either direct or indirect trust rating towards peer A.
The simulation starts with initial parameters as in Table 6.3, generates network
topology, and initializes local trust tables following the given distribution. Then
the VectorTrust aggregation processes are simulated step by step for all peers con-
currently. To measure the performance under dynamic models, new transactions is
continuously generated according to a poisson distribution with an arrival rate λ = 10
to 50 transactions per service cycle, between a random source node and a random
destination node. New peer will randomly join the network, and peer leave/die also
randomly happens. In such a dynamic model and even in a real P2P network, it
is hard to achieve strictly convergence status. In our simulation, the convergence
in a dynamic environment is ϵ-convergence, and ϵ-convergence is defined as that the
variance between any peer’s two consecutive trust tables is smaller than the pre-set
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(a) D = 3 (b) D = 6 (c) D = 9
Figure 6.8: Network Complexity Setting. The trust network complexity is represented
in terms of nodes’ trust outdegree D. The links shows the initial direct trust relation
between peers. Green points represent normal/good peers, and red points represent
malicious peers.
threshold ϵ.
6.2.2 Results and Analysis
Convergence Time. VectorTrust convergence time is measured in terms of the
number of iterations needed to establish each peer’s trust table and achieve conver-
gence status. The term “convergence” in a dynamic environment is ϵ-convergence
which indicates that the variance between any peer’s two consecutive trust table is
smaller than the pre-set threshold ϵ.
The relationship between the network size, network complexity and convergence
time are shown in Figure 6.9. The figure shows that VectorTrust only needs a small
number of aggregation cycles before convergence. For instance, in a 800-nodes P2P
network with network complexity D = 6, convergence takes only 8 iterations. We
also observe that convergence time decreases as network complexity increases. This
is reasonable because in a more complex network, each peer has higher connectivity
and can obtain more information in one iteration. In a network with N nodes, a
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Figure 6.9: Convergence Time
peer needs logD N iterations to retrieve all relevant trust information on average.
Therefore, as network size N increases, convergence time increases relatively slowly
as shown in Figure 6.9, in the order of O(logD N). This shows that VectorTrust
features satisfactory scalability.






























Figure 6.10: Average Message Overhead
Communication Message Overhead. In most of the trust and reputation
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schemes, reputation aggregation is quite expensive when the network grows to large
number of nodes. Figure 6.18 shows the average communication message overhead
for per individual peer to achieve convergence in VectorTrust. The message overhead
grows slowly with network size growing, which shows that VectorTrust is a lightweight
scheme. The computed trust values do not change significantly after convergence
status even if there are new transactions coming. The observation is that in a network
with high complexity, VectorTrust system incurs more message overheads but takes
less convergence time. Overall, per service cycle, average messages needed for each
peer is in the order of O(D) where D is network complexity. In a typical VectorTrust
network, D is in the order of O(lgN). To achieve convergence, it takes O(lgN)
iterations. Therefore, the average message overhead for each peer to converge is
O(lg2 N). And the average message overhead for each peer in one iteration is O(lgN).





























Figure 6.11: Average Trust Path Length
Average Trust Path Length. Average trust path length is a unique evaluation
metric for VectorTrust scheme. It indicates the average length of a trust path starts
from a source peer to a destination peer in convergence status. The effects of vari-
ous network size and network complexity on average trust path length are shown in
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Figure 6.19. Generally, a peer should reach its target within 6 hops. In most cases,
the converged trust path is between 3 and 6. In the network where the complexity is
too low, e.g., D = 3, lots of trust paths length is more than 6, and the average even
reaches 8 hops. This kinds of longer trust paths involve more trust transfers and it
leads to lower accuracy in inferred trust ratings.































Figure 6.12: Average Trust Table Size
Average Trust Table Size. The average trust table size for each individual peer
in VectorTrust is shown in Figure 6.12. The curves correspond to various network
sizes and complexities. Trust table size grows with network size. That is, most peers
have accesses to all other peers’ trust information over the whole network. This fact
indicates the trust information spreads fast and extensively in VectorTrust. In a large
P2P network, the trust table can have hundreds or thousands of entries. The storage
overhead could be a burden. However, the VectorTrust environment is composed
mostly by fixed desktops or laptops. The storage requirement for a thousands of
entities text trust table is affordable in most terminals. To avoid huge trust table
size in a large network of storage limited devices such as PDAs or sensors, we suggest
to use group based hybrid trust aggregation. In group based VectorTrust scheme,
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multiple peers can be reflected as one entity in a hybrid trust table, which greatly
reduces the trust table size. Nodes within the same work group share the group’s trust
rating. In addition, we can apply Least Recent Used (LRU) mechanism to remove
inactive peers/entries in the table.


























Figure 6.13: Query Hit Rate
Query Hit Rate. A basic function in VectorTrust is trust rating query where one
local peer searches in its local trust table trying to find remote peer’s trust rating. The
query hit rate is the percentage of successfully completed queries over total number
of queries issued. As shown in Figure 6.13, when the network complexity exceeds a
special threshold. The query hit rate approaches 100%. In a less complex network
where peers have only a few connections to other peers, the query hit rate is much
lower. In reality, such low network complexity does not happen often. We test this
kind of less complex network in experiment only for comparison purpose. Note that,
100% hit rate does not indicate 100% trust ratings in local trust tables correctly reflect
the trust features of remote peers. The correctness of local trust tables is discussed
below.
Accuracy. VectorTrust aggregation accuracy is measured by “Effective Trust
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Figure 6.14: Aggregation Accuracy
Rating Rate” shown by Figure 6.14. One inferred trust rating is effective if and only
if the variance between the trust rating and remote peer’s real behavior (represented
by a pre-set rating score) is less than the pre-set threshold γ. On average, the accuracy
of VectorTrust is maintained around 90%. This result is very encouraging because
VectorTrust is a personalized trust system using inferred (not direct) trust and the
information for each node to access is limited. When the network complexity is low,
the aggregation accuracy decreases a lot. As we discussed before, in less complex
network, the longer trust paths involves more trust transfers, which leads to lower
accuracy in inferred trust ratings. To eliminate the effect of long trust paths, we
advise to use weighted trust rating rw = d
√
r (r: trust rating, d: total hops).
Malicious Peer Detection. The malicious peer detection rate and detection
speed are measured. We study the problem of inferring indirect trust when direct
trust information is not available. So the malicious behavior in trust rating generation
period is beyond the scope of this paper (which was discussed in [11]). In this paper,
we study the malicious behavior in trust path aggregation and trust transferring
process. Malicious peers cheat in transactions and it sends fake trust tables to peers
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(f) Detection False Positive (α =
50%)
Figure 6.15: Malicious Peer Detection Rate
they interact with. In this simulation, the malicious peers adopt a mix of false and
true information strategy. The fake message rate is set as %50 which indicates half
of the tables a malicious peer sent is fake. In our simulation, peers start voting phase
periodically. One peer is identified as malicious if more than θv eligible peers in the
network vote it as malicious. As claimed, for a candidate peer A, the eligible voting
peers is defined as the peer set that has either direct or indirect trust rating towards
peer A. Initial malicious peer percentage is set as α = 10%, 30%, 50%.
Figure 6.15 reports the malicious peer detection rate and the related false positive
rate as a function of network size. In general, the false positive rate increases reversely
proportional to the detection rate. In a normal network setting (D = 6, 9, α =
10%, 30%), more than 95% of malicious peers are identified with a false positive rate
less than 5%. Even in a less complex network (D = 3), the detection rate still achieves
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(c) α = 50%
Figure 6.16: Malicious Peer Detection Time
90%. But in such a network, the false positive is rather high.
VectorTrust detection malicious peer speed is shown in Figure 6.16 under different
malicious percentage configurations. Increasing the percentage of malicious peers does
not lead to lower performance. VectorTrust is able to detect most of malicious peers
before aggregation converges. And malicious peers are much easier to be detected in
a complex network. Given a network with 1000-nodes with D = 6 and α = 30%, for
example, VectorTrust detects more than 95% malicious peers in 8 iterations.
6.3 Simulate cTrust in Cyclic Mobile Environment
6.3.1 Experiment Setup
CMANET Contact Pattern Model. We construct an unstructured network based
on the NUS student trace. The data of contact patterns is from the class schedules for
the Spring semester of 2006 in National University of Singapore (NUS) among 22341
students with 4875 sessions [68, 69]. For each enrollment student, we have her/his
class schedule. It gives us extremely accurate information about the contact patterns
among students over large time scales. The contact patterns among students inside
classrooms were presented in [68]. Following class schedules, students move around
on campus and meet each other when they are in the same session. The trace data
set considers only students movements during business hours, and ignores contacts
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that students hang around campus for various activities outside of class. The time
is compressed by removing any idle time slots without any active sessions. So the
contacts take place only in classrooms. Two students are within communication range
of each other if and only if they are in the same classroom at the same time. The
sessions can be considered as classes. The unit time is one hour, and a session may
last multiple hours. The NUS contact patterns can be modeled as CMANET. In our
experiment, 100 to 1000 students are randomly chosen to simulate 100 to 1000 moving
peers in CMANET. Following her/his class schedule, each student appears moving
cyclically in classrooms. The contact probability P is set as 0.9 which indicates that
when two nodes meet, they have a probability of 0.9 to communicate. We considered
all 4875 sessions in the data set. The time for the whole system cycle (CS) is 77 hours
(time units).
Trust Topology Model. The random trust topology and scale-free trust topol-
ogy are used to establish trust relationships in this simulation. In random trust
topology, the trust outdegree of a peer follows normal distribution with mean value
µd = 20, 25, 30 and variance σ
2
d = 5. On the random trust topology, all peers have
similar initial trust links. Under the scale-free trust topology, highly active peers pos-
sess large numbers of trust links, and most other peers only have small numbers of
trust links. The number of trust links follows power law distribution with an scaling
exponent k = 2.
Parameter Setting. The network is configured from 100 nodes to 1000 nodes.
The network complexity is represented in terms of nodes’ average outdegree d. A
network complexity with d = 20, 25, 30 indicates on average, the initial nodes’ outde-
grees is 20, 25, 30. Peer’s real behavior is represented by a pre-set normal distribution
(µr = 0.25, 0.75, σ
2
r = 0.2) rating score r ∈ [0, 1]. As mentioned in Section ??, we
assume the accurate direct trust ratings have already been generated. This is rea-
sonable because any trust inference scheme must rely on an accurate trust rating
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scheme. It is meaningless to study the inference trust based on the direct trust rat-
ing if the direct trust rating is not reliable. So in our simulation, the direct trust
rating R ∈ [0, 1] is generated with a normal distribution (µR = r, σ2R = 0.1) based
on peer’s real behavior score r. The parameters in iteration function is set up as
learning rate α = 1, discount factor γ = 1 and adjusting factor na = 9. To measure
the performance under dynamic models, new transactions is continuously generated
according to a poisson distribution with an arrival rate λ = 10 to 50 transactions per
service cycle, between a random source node and a random destination node. New
node will randomly join the network, and peer leave/die also randomly happens. In
such a dynamic model and in a real mobile ad hoc network, it is hard to achieve
strictly convergence status. So the convergence in our simulation is ϵ-convergence,
and ϵ-convergence is defined as that the variance between any peer’s two consecutive
trust tables is smaller than the pre-set threshold ϵ = 0.02.
6.3.2 Results and Analysis

























(a) Random Trust Topology

























(b) Scale-Free Trust Topology
Figure 6.17: Convergence Time
Convergence Time. The convergence time is measured in terms of the number
of time units needed to achieve ϵ-convergence status. Figure 6.17 shows that cTrust
only needs a small number of aggregation cycles before convergence. We also observe
that convergence time increases as network complexity increases. As network size
N increases, convergence time increases relatively slowly (O(n)). This shows that
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cTrust features satisfactory scalability. We also observe that the trust topologies do
not affect the convergence time so much as network size.


















(a) Random Trust Topology


















(b) Scale-Free Trust Topology
Figure 6.18: Message Overhead
Communication Message Overhead. Figure 6.18 shows the average commu-
nication message overhead to achieve convergence per individual peer. cTrust greatly
reduce the communication message overhead by using MDP model. This is because,
in each iteration, each node only receive trust table for one of its most trusted neigh-
bors (Equation (4.5)). The message overhead grows slowly as the network size grows,
showing that cTrust is a lightweight scheme. In a network with high complexity,
cTrust system incurs more message overheads. In a typical cTrust network, the av-
erage message overhead is affected by only network size N and complexity d and not
affected by trust topology. As a result, the overhead curves for both topologies in the
figures appear similar.






















(a) Random Trust Topology






















(b) Scale-Free Trust Topology
Figure 6.19: Average Trust Path Length
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Average Trust Path Length. Figure 6.19 indicates the average length of a trust
path starts from a source peer to a destination peer in convergence status. Generally,
the trust path length increases with the network size and complexity, which indicates
peers gain more remote trust information. In the scale-free trust topology, the trust
path length is greatly reduced. This is because in scale-free trust topology most peers
have only a few connections while some power peers control many links, making trust
information hard to spread. In a complex network where trust information can be
spread father, there are more longer trust paths and involve more trust transfers.




















(a) Random Trust Topology




















(b) Scale-Free Trust Topology
Figure 6.20: Aggregation Accuracy
Accuracy. cTrust aggregation accuracy is measured by comparing all the inferred
trust ratings with peers real behavior scores. The similarity is considered as aggrega-
tion accuracy. As shown in Figure 6.20, on average, cTrust aggregation accuracy is
maintained above 90%. The result is very encouraging because cTrust is a personal-
ized trust system using inferred (not direct) trust and the information for each node
to access is limited in CMANETs. As the network complexity increases, the accuracy
decreases. This is because in complex networks, there are more long trust paths that
involve more trust transfers, resulting in lower accuracy in inferred trust ratings due
to multi-hop relationships. The accuracy in scale-free trust topology is slightly higher
than in random trust topology. One reason is in scale-free trust topology, the average
trust path is shorter which leads to high accuracy in trust transfer.
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6.4 Incentive Mechanism Experimental Evaluation
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Figure 6.21: The Density of Strategies
A P2P network for file sharing is simulated. The basic parameter setting and
default values used in the simulation are summarized in Table 6.3. The network
consists of 1000 nodes with an average node lifetime of T = 200 hours. All nodes are
independently and identically distributed in the system. To evaluate the performance
in dynamic environment, new generated nodes are continuously joining the network
according to a poisson distribution (arrival rate λ = 10 per iteration cycle), and
nodes die and nodes leave are also randomly happened. The node population size
stays constant which is 1000 in our experiment. The storage space of each node
is Mem = 1MB. We assume there are small files stored per nodes. The unit time
is set up as 1 hour which represents one feedback iterations round. Each peer was
assigned an initial currency/credit following a normal distribution with mean µc = 50
and variance σ2c = 10. We assume the utility can be negative. The file download
transactions occur in each iteration, with the occurrence rate β = 10% of the total
population. In each iteration, two nodes are randomly paired to start small file
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download transaction once. Mutual transactions are reported by reporters. A third
node acts as the querist and it queries the transaction type.
We use the environment parameter setting in Section ?? as the “basic wage
scheme” where αs = 3, αf = 1 and P = 50%. Accordingly, the outputs are qf = 0.5,
qs = 4.5, and the wages are ws ≈ 2.36, wf ≈ 0.14. We assume the P2P system
is a homogeneous system. All transactions consume the same cost to reporters and
provide the same output to querists. To compare the performance, we also propose
the “enhanced wage scheme” in which we increase wage to ws ≈ 2.5 to eliminate
{m = failed, T = successful} equilibrium. In the enhanced wage scheme, wf stays
the same as in the basic wage scheme where wf ≈ 0.14.
All nodes are self-interested, and they can change their interaction strategies/behavior
adaptively to maximize their own utility (credits in this experiment). A cooperative
node indicates that a node provides truthful feedback, while a noncooperative node
represents a node that gives dishonest report. For each reporting round, the reporter
should evaluate the cost and the expected wage rationally to determine each message
feedback submission. However, to measure some unpredictable behavior in real-world
application, we allow peer to randomly adopt some irrational activities at a low prob-
ability 5%. At the start stage, there are a mix of 500 cooperative nodes and 500
noncooperative nodes.
The simulation generates P2P network topology, and initializes peers’ initial credit/currency
with the mean value 50. The process of the incentive scheme is simulated step by
step for all peers concurrently.
6.4.2 Incentive Mechanism Results and Analysis
We define the density of a strategy as the number of the nodes employing the strategy
(cooperative/noncooperative) among all the nodes. The relation between strategies











































(b) Utility for Consistent Honest Behavior (with
Random irrational Activities)








































(b) Utility for Consistent Honest Feedbacks (with
Random irrational Activities)
Figure 6.23: Single Querist’s Utility for Honest Feedbacks
ure 6.21. At the starting stage, there are 500 cooperative nodes and 500 noncoopera-
tive nodes. After a few iterations, the cooperative nodes dominate the population of
the network in both the two schemes. For basic wage scheme, the cooperative pop-
ulation is around three fourths which is less than the population in enhanced wage
scheme. This is because in basic wage scheme, when the transaction state is “suc-
cessful” there is no incentive for peers to report truth. That is, in the “successful”
status, basic wage scheme has two equilibrium {m = successful, T = successful}
and {m = failed, T = successful}, which results a portion of dishonest report. In
enhanced wage scheme, the cooperative nodes increase sharply for the reason that

















































(b) Utility for Consistent Dishonest Behavior
(with Random irrational Activities)
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(b) Utility for Consistent Dishonest Feedbacks
(with Random irrational Activities)
Figure 6.25: Single Querist’s Utility for Dishonest Feedbacks
receive higher payoff if they report truth in “successful” state. The cooperative peers
cannot achieve 100% because we allow peers to randomly adopt some irrational activ-
ities at a low probability 5%, which leads to some unpredictable reporting activities.
In the basic wage scheme, assuming a reporter always adopts honest feedbacks,
its utility is shown in Figure 6.22(a). At time 0, The initial average utility is set up
as 50. The results show that the reporter’s utility keeps the same around 50 with
time going on. This is consistent with the analytical results calculated by Formula
(5.18) (the reporters’ average utility maintains at the same level). Figure 6.22(b)
shows the results when the reporter is allowing to randomly adopt some irrational
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(b) Average Social Utility V.S. Time












































































(b) Enhanced Wage Scheme
Figure 6.27: Dishonest Feedback Rate
the curve shown, node’s utility decreases every time when it submits dishonest feed-
back. Accordingly, the single querist’s utility is shown by Figure 6.23 when reporter’s
feedbacks are honest. In both cases, querist’s utility keeps increasing. The curves
in Figure 6.23(a) and 6.23(b) demonstrate that the reporter’s irrational behavior in
honest reporting does not significantly affect querist’s utility.
In basic wage scheme, when a reporter always gives dishonest feedbacks, its utility
is shown by Figure 6.24(a). The reporter’s utility keeps decreasing sharply because
every {m = succcessful, T = failed} feedback will lead to a loss 17.89 units of
utility for the reporter as shown in Figure ??. When the reporter is allowed to
randomly adopt some irrational behavior, its utility is slightly higher (shown by Fig-
ure 6.24(b)) than consistent dishonest feedbacks. And the random behavior may lead
to a small portion of honest feedbacks to gain some positive utility. Corresponding to
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the reporter’s dishonest behavior, the single querist’s utility is shown by Figure 6.25.
Similarly, the curves in Figure 6.25(a) and 6.25(b) prove that the reporter’s irra-
tional behavior in dishonest reporting does not significantly affect querist’s utility.
Comparing the results in Figure 6.23 and Figure 6.25, we could notice that querist’s
utility will not be significantly affected by reporter’s feedback strategies.
Figure 6.26(a) shows the querists’ and reporters’ average utility in basic wage and
enhanced wage scheme. Querists’ average utility keeps increasing linearly in both
of the schemes. In enhanced wage scheme, querists’ utility increase faster than the
basic scheme. This is because the enhanced wage eliminate m = failed report at
T = successful status, it leads to more output credits for querists. The reporters’
average utility keeps decreasing which is a little different from the analytical results
calculated by Formula (5.18) (the reporters’ average utility maintains at the same
level) because we allow peers to randomly adopt some irrational behavior at a low
probability. Reporters employ irrational behavior with a small probability (5%). The
reporters’ average utility is higher in enhanced wage scheme than basic scheme for
the reason that querists provide reporters more wage in enhanced wage scheme. The
querists achieve maximum utility while enforcing the truthful feedback when they
enhance the wage as little as it can be above the boarding line. The average social
utility which is the sum of the querists’ utility and reporters’ utility is shown by
Figure 6.26(b). By slightly enhancing the wage, we achieve higher social utility in
enhanced wage scheme.
Dishonest feedback indicates the feedback that is not consistent with the real
transaction type. Fatal dishonest feedback is defined as {m = succcessful, T =
failed}, which can damage the reputation system because it hides a failed transaction.
Dishonest feedback and fatal dishonest feedback rate in both schemes are shown in
Figure 6.27(a) and Figure 6.27(b). Our solution greatly prevents fatal dishonest
feedbacks from happening. {m = succcessful, T = failed} feedbacks are less than
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5% in both schemes. Note that, lots of the dishonest feedbacks are generated by
nodes’ irrational behavior which are preset in simulation environment parameters. In
the basic scheme, there is a large portion of {m = failed, T = successful} feedbacks,
and it is reduced to less than 10% in enhanced wage scheme. The experimental results
show that our scheme reinforces truthful reporting and functions well even if a large
portion of transactions are failed (P = 50%).
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Table 6.3: Simulation Parameter Setting (WIM)
Notation Environment Parameter Default Value
N Network size 1000
T Node lifetime 200 hours
Mem Node storage space 1MB
P The probability for a random
transaction to be successful
50%
αs Cost factor for success transac-
tion
3
αf Cost factor for fail transaction 1
ws Wage for “successful” feedback 2.36, 2.5
wf Wage for “failed” feedback 0.14
qs Output for “successful” feedback 4.5
qf Output for “failed” feedback 0.5
µc Initial currency distribution mean
value
50
σ2c Initial currency distribution vari-
ance
10
β Transaction occurrence rate 10%
Pact irrational activities rate 5%
λ Expected number of new gener-





We presented the TrustNet scheme to manage trust in peer-to-peer networks, specif-
ically, we proposed the H-Trust aggregation scheme, the trust vector, trust inference
and trust vector dissemination algorithms, and cTrust dissemination in cyclic mobile
space.
H-Trust is a personalized reactive selective aggregation based group reputation
system H-Trust for collaborative resource sharing and execution in P2P desktop grids.
Simulation results demonstrated that H-Trust can quickly identify malicious peers
under system uncertainties and incomplete information about states of large-scale
distributed systems and applications. As a result, H-Trust provides an efficient and
robust means to prevent spreading of malicious content. H-Trust allows individual
peers to compute local trust values for other users or groups using their own inference
algorithm of choice, and thus can be used to implement a variety of distributed and
heterogeneous policies.
VectorTrust scheme is proposed to manage trust in peer-to-peer networks with
static topology. The experimental results show that VectorTrust scheme is efficient
in trust aggregation. After O(logD N) iterations, most peers establish local trust
tables and reach convergence. VectorTrust convergence time and message overhead
increase slowly with network size growing, demonstrating its high scalability. The
trust information spreads fast and extensively in VectorTrust. The computational
overhead of VectorTrust is reasonable comparing to the existing trust schemes which
makes it easy to deploy in the decentralized environment. For example, EigenTrust
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is presented as a global trust metric, while VectorTrust as a local trust metric. In a
large network with dynamic topology the EigenTrust server has to calculate the eigen
value for the whole network from time to time, which involves heavy computational
overhead in the server end. In VectorTrust each peer just has to relax trust value
by bellman-ford algorithm. The lightweight local relax algorithm makes VectorTrust
more suitable to decentralized environment without powerful server. The comparison
results also show that VectorTrust scheme performs well even when a large number
of peers are malicious.
As expected, the trust rating inference accuracy in VectorTrust scheme is less
than a traditional global reputation system. This fact suggests that we still have to
improve the aggregation algorithm of VectorTrust and make it more accurate. The
slightly lower accuracy is reasonable because of the nature of VectorTrust scheme.
VectorTrust uses inferred trust rating in stead of direct experience. VectorTrust
aggregates trust ratings with a limited direct experience in the network where most
of current schemes require a large number of existing direct experiences to compute
trust ratings. VectorTrust is designed to be used in a distributed and decentralized
network with no global trust information. Another important observation is that
VectorTrust works better in more complex networks. This is encouraging because
the current P2P networks are becoming more complex and VectorTrust is suitable to
such kinds of networks.
cTrust scheme is aimed to provide a common framework to enable trust infer-
ring in a CMANET trust landscape. We presented the trust transfer function, trust
value iteration function, and the cTrust distribution trust aggregation algorithm. To
validate our proposed algorithms and protocols, we conducted extensive evaluation
based on NUS students trace data. The experimental results demonstrate that cTrust
scheme trust aggregation is efficient. cTrust convergence time increases slowly with
network size. Message overhead in cTrust is modest. The trust information spreads
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fast and extensively in CMANETs. The trust rating inference accuracy in cTrust
scheme is over 90%. We believe that cTrust establishes a solid foundation to design
trust-enabled applications and middleware in CMANETs.
To gain better understanding of trust landscape in TrustNet, we also introduced
the notion of trust spanning tree and trust transitive closure. We have presented
the game theoretic model and wage-based incentive mechanism to encourage truth-
ful feedback in reputation systems. Our contributions are multifold. (1) Assuming
peers in reputation systems are self-interested, we modeled the feedback reporting
problem as the reporting game. (2) we designed a wage-based incentive mechanism
for enforcing truthful report. Different from most existing schemes, our algorithm
does not require peers to verify the information truthfulness. Leveraging the mech-
anism design theory, a set of rules including participation constraint and incentive
compatibility constraints were defined in detail. The solution requires only localized
wage payment schemes. (3) To gain better understanding of landscape in our scheme,
initial characteristics of our scheme were investigated.
To validate our proposed algorithms, we conducted extensive simulation-based
experiments. The simulation results demonstrate that TrustNet is efficient, accurate,
scalable, and robust. We believe that TrustNet establishes a solid foundation to
support trust-enabled applications and middleware.
The ongoing and future work includes two aspects. First, we would like extend
each trust aggregation/dissemination by considering our proposed incentive mecha-
nisms and peer anonymity and evaluate the performance to ensure fairness, truthful-
ness and system efficiency. Second, we will deploy TrustNet system in a realworld
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